with the returns on FundCreator-based dynamic futures trading strategies with the same risk and dependence characteristics, we find that no more than 18.6% of the funds of funds and 22.5% of the individual hedge funds in our sample convincingly beat the benchmark. In other words, the majority of hedge funds have not provided their investors with returns, which they could not have generated themselves by mechanically trading a diversified basket of liquid futures contracts. Over time, we observe a substantial deterioration in overall hedge fund performance. In addition, we find a tendency for the performance of successful funds to deteriorate over time. This supports the hypothesis that increased assets under management tend to endanger future performance.
Despite these important differences, the results confirm our earlier conclusions on the state of the hedge fund industry and thereby also the robustness of the FundCreator-based evaluation procedure. Roughly 80% of hedge funds and fund of funds have generated after-fee returns that do not exceed the returns that investors could easily have generated themselves by mechanically trading futures.
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Introduction
With the first hedge fund dating back to 1949, hedge funds have been around for quite some time. Academic research into hedge funds, however, only took off towards the end of the 1990s when sufficient data became available. Since then, and inspired by the strong growth of the hedge fund industry worldwide, a respectable number of research papers and articles have provided insight in many different aspects of hedge funds. One question largely remains unanswered though. Do hedge funds provide their investors with superior returns? In other words, do hedge funds provide their investors with returns, which they could not have obtained otherwise?
According to the hedge fund industry itself, the answer to the above question is of course affirmative, although with the recent disappointing performance of hedge funds, this point is put forward less often and less forcefully than it used to.
Nowadays, most emphasis is on the diversification properties of hedge funds. Various academic studies have attempted to shed light on the issue of hedge fund return superiority as well. Most of these apply traditional performance measures, such as the Sharpe ratio or factor model based alphas, to hedge fund returns obtained from one or more of the main hedge fund databases. The conclusion is typically that hedge fund returns are indeed superior. From other studies, however, it is now well understood that raw hedge fund return data may suffer from various biases, which, when not corrected for, will produce artificially high Sharpe ratios and alphas. In addition, hedge fund returns are typically not normally distributed and may derive from exposure to very unusual risk factors. This makes traditional performance measures unsuitable for hedge funds, as deviations from normality as well as every risk factor that is incorrectly specified or left out altogether, will tend to show up as alpha, thereby suggesting superior performance where there actually may be none.
In theory, once the relevant risk factors have been identified, factor model based performance evaluation of hedge fund returns should work well. In practice, however, we don't know enough about hedge fund return generation to be certain that all the relevant risk factors are included and correctly specified. As a result, factor models typically explain only 20-30% of the variation in individual hedge fund returns, which compares very unfavourably with the 90-95% that is typical for mutual funds.
Although the procedure works better for portfolios of hedge funds, funds of hedge funds and hedge fund indices, where most of the idiosyncratic risk is diversified away, the low determination coefficients of these models make it impossible to arrive at a firm conclusion with respect to the superiority of hedge fund returns.
It is quite surprising that so many people, on the buy-side as well as in academia, are so eager to believe that the, sometimes huge, alphas reported for hedge funds are truly there. Anyone who is well calibrated to the world we live in and the global capital markets in particular, knows how difficult it is to consistently beat the market, i.e. systematically obtain a better return than what would be fair given the risks taken.
Over time, hundreds, if not thousands, of studies have confirmed this. Is it therefore likely that suddenly we are facing a whole new breed of super-managers; not one or two, but literally thousands of them? If anything, the rise of the hedge fund industry has made markets more efficient, not less.
Although by far the most popular, factor models are not the only way to evaluate hedge fund performance. Based on previous work by Amin and Kat (2003) , Kat and Palaro (2005) , or KP for short, recently developed a technique that allows the derivation of dynamic trading strategies, trading cash, stocks, bonds, etc., which generate returns with predefined statistical properties. The technique is not only capable of replicating the statistical properties of fund of funds returns, but works equally well for individual hedge fund returns. Since the KP replicating strategies are explicitly constructed to replicate the complete risk and dependence profile of a fund, the average return on these strategies can be used as a performance measure. When the average fund return is significantly higher than the average return on the replication strategy, the fund is the most efficient alternative and vice versa.
The KP replication technique is similar to that used in Amin and Kat (2003) . The important difference, however, is that the latter only replicate the marginal distribution of the fund return, while KP also replicate its dependence structure with an investor's existing portfolio. This is a very significant step forward as most investors nowadays are attracted to hedge funds because of their relatively weak relationship with traditional asset classes, i.e. their diversification potential. Only replicating the marginal distribution without giving any consideration to the dependence structure between the fund and the investor's existing portfolio would therefore be insufficient.
From a performance evaluation perspective, replication of a fund's dependence pattern with other asset classes is a necessity. According to theory as well as casual empirical observation, expected return and systematic co-variance, co-skewness and co-kurtosis are directly related. In other words, it is not so much the marginal distribution, but its dependence structure with other assets that determines an asset's expected return. An asset, which is highly correlated with stocks and bonds, offers investors very little in terms of diversification potential. As a consequence, there will be little demand for this asset. Its price will be low and its expected return therefore relatively high. On the other hand, an asset that offers substantial diversification potential will be in high demand. Its price will be high and its expected return relatively low. Although hedge funds are not priced by market forces in the same way as primitive assets are, they do operate in the latter markets. It therefore seems plausible that a similar phenomenon is present in hedge fund returns as well 1 .
The KP Efficiency Measure
Applying the KP replication technique to hedge funds, the goal is to create a dynamic trading strategy, which generates returns with the same statistical properties as a given hedge fund or fund of funds, i.e. returns that are drawings from the same distribution as the distribution from which the actual fund returns are drawn. The basic idea behind the procedure is straightforward. From the theory of dynamic trading it is well known that in the standard theoretical model with complete markets any payoff function can be hedged perfectly. This observation forms the foundation of arbitragebased option pricing theory. If it is possible to find a payoff function which, given the distribution of the underlying assets, implies the same distribution as the one from which the fund returns are drawn, then the accompanying dynamic trading strategy will generate returns that are drawings from that distribution.
Given the KP replication technique and following the same reasoning as in Amin and Kat (2003), we derived the following evaluation procedure, which consists of five distinct steps.
1. Monthly return data are collected on the fund to be evaluated, the representative investor's portfolio, and a so-called reserve asset. The latter is the main source of uncertainty in the replication strategy. As we want to know whether the returns that investors obtain from hedge funds are superior, fund returns should be net of all fees.
2. From the available return data, the bivariate distribution of the fund return and the representative investor's portfolio return is inferred (KP refer to this as the 'desired distribution'). The same is done for the bivariate distribution of the investor's portfolio return and the return on the reserve asset (the 'building block distribution'). In line with KP, we allow for 54 different joint distributions, choosing between them using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 2 .
3. Assuming an initial investment in the fund of 100, we determine the cheapest payoff function, which is able to turn the building block distribution into the desired distribution. This payoff function is known as the 'desired payoff function' and lies at the basis of the KP replication strategies.
4. The desired payoff function is priced using the multivariate option pricing model of Boyle and Lin (1997) , which explicitly allows for transaction costs.
For the pricing of the payoff function, we estimate the required volatility and correlation inputs over the period covered by the track record of the fund being evaluated. We use the average 1-month interest rate over the same period for the interest rate input. We will refer to the price thus obtained as 'the KP efficiency measure'.
2 See Akaike (1973) for details.
5. Finally, we compare the KP efficiency measure with the 100 initially invested in the fund. If the efficiency measure is 100 as well, then the replication strategy and the fund are equivalent. If the efficiency measure is less (more) than 100, the strategy is cheaper (more expensive) than the fund and the fund therefore inefficient (efficient).
All performance evaluation studies in finance follow the same general procedure.
First, using a fund's track record and possibly some additional data over the same period as well, the fund return is characterized in some way. With the Sharpe ratio this is done by calculating the volatility of the fund return. With alphas this is done by estimating a fund's exposure to the relevant risk factors. Second, based on this characterization, a benchmark return is determined and compared with the actual average fund return over its track record. With the Sharpe ratio the benchmark return is derived from the average index return and the volatility of the index, while with alphas it derives from the average returns of the risk factors.
Our procedure is not different. We just use a different characterization. Where others use volatility or factor loadings, we use the desired payoff function. Where others use the average return on the index or the chosen risk factors, we use the average interest rate, building block volatilities and correlation over a fund's track record to set a benchmark. What is different, however, is that we do not need to make any unrealistically strong assumptions concerning the exact nature of a fund's risk exposure or the behaviour of markets in general. As shown by KP, a fairly limited set of returns will often be enough to obtain a sufficiently good estimate of the desired distribution and the efficiency measure. As such, our procedure is quite robust.
Another point worth noting about the above evaluation procedure is the fact that it explicitly takes transaction costs into account by, instead of a Black-Scholes type option pricing model, using the Boyle and Lin (1997) model. In factor model based evaluations, transaction costs are typically ignored, despite the fact that maintaining the replicating portfolio's factor loadings at their desired levels is likely to require significant periodic rebalancing. In addition, when dealing with hedge funds the risk factors used may be quite unusual and may therefore be accompanied by significant levels of transaction costs.
In the evaluations, we do not use hedge funds' raw returns. The reason is that, as shown in Brooks and Kat (2002) and Lo et al. (2004) for example, monthly hedge fund returns may exhibit high levels of autocorrelation. This primarily results from the fact that many hedge funds invest in illiquid securities, which are hard to mark to market. When confronted with this problem, hedge fund administrators will either use the last reported transaction price or a conservative estimate of the current market price. This creates artificial lags in the evolution of hedge funds' net asset values, i.e.
artificial smoothing of the reported returns. As a result, estimates of volatility, for example, will be biased downwards.
One possible method to correct for this bias is found in the real estate finance literature. Due to smoothing in appraisals and infrequent valuations of properties, the returns of direct property investment indices suffer from similar problems as hedge fund returns. The approach employed in this literature has been to "unsmooth" the observed returns to create a new set of returns which are more volatile and whose characteristics are believed to more accurately capture the characteristics of the underlying property values. Nowadays, there are several unsmoothing methodologies available. In this study we use the method originally proposed by Geltner (1991).
An Example
To clarify the above, let's look at a worked-out example. XYZ is a well-known fund of hedge funds, which started in 1985. Given XYZ's monthly, net-of-fee returns since 1985, the first step is to model the joint distribution of XYZ and the investor's portfolio, as well as the joint distribution of the investor's portfolio and the reserve asset. Before we can do so we need to decide what exactly the investor's portfolio and the reserve asset are, as well as unsmooth the raw fund return data.
Let's assume that the representative investor's portfolio consists of 50% S&P 500 and 50% long-dated US Treasury bonds. Let's also assume that all exposure management is done in the futures markets. Futures have several advantages over cash, in particular high liquidity and low transaction costs, which is extremely important given the dynamic nature of the KP replication strategies. We trade S&P 500 futures on the CME and T-bond futures on the CBOT. To keep things simple, we use nearby Eurodollar futures (CME) as the reserve asset.
<< Insert Table 1 Here >> Table 1 shows the marginal risk characteristics of the raw and unsmoothed XYZ returns. From the table, we see that XYZ's raw returns exhibit negative skewness and positive autocorrelation. Application of the unsmoothing procedure eliminates the autocorrelation and produces returns with the same degree of skewness, but with a substantially higher volatility (annualised 14.7% vs. 12.8% for the raw returns).
We are now ready to infer the desired and the building block distribution. Using the same methodology as KP, we find that the best fit (according to the AIC) is provided by the following set of marginals and copulas 3 : Given the above distributions, we can derive the desired payoff function following the methodology developed in KP. The result is depicted in Figure 1 and shows that the desired payoff is an increasing function of both the investor's portfolio and the reserve asset, implying that the replication strategy will take long positions in both assets.
Subsequently, we price this payoff function using the Boyle and Lin (1997) Trading S&P 500, T-bond and Eurodollar futures, investors could have generated the same risk profile as XYZ and obtained a higher average return at the same time.
<< Insert Figure 1 and 2 Here >> To see how well the derived payoff function succeeds in replicating the desired distribution, Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of the investor's portfolio return versus the XYZ return (left) as well as a plot of the portfolio return versus the replicated return (right). The two plots are very similar, suggesting that the replication has indeed been successful. We see that the replication strategy is unable to replicate the three large losses that XYZ reported during the sample period. This is not surprising as these are clearly outliers, which simply cannot be captured by a parametric model like ours.
<< Insert Table 2 Here >> A further indication of the accuracy of the replication strategy comes from comparing the mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of XYZ's returns with those of the replicated returns. The latter statistics can be found in the perspective taken is that of a USD-based investor. Table 3 provides some information on the start and end dates of the track records of the funds in our sample. Table 3 Here >> Table 3 shows that, reflecting the increasing popularity of hedge funds in the second half of the 1990s, the majority of funds started after 1994. Most hedge fund databases, first started collecting data around the mid to late 1990s. As a result, they contain no funds that stopped reporting before that time. Out of the 875 funds in our database, 218 funds stopped reporting before November 2006. This confirms that, although lower than for individual hedge funds (see section 7), the attrition rate in funds of funds is still quite high.
<< Insert
<< Insert Table 4 Here >> Table 4 provides details on the length of the available fund of funds track records. Out of the 875 funds in the sample, only 220 have 10 or more years of history. This again reflects the fact that most funds of funds are still relatively young and attrition can be significant.
Distributional Analysis
A crucial stage in the evaluation procedure is the proper modelling of the distributional characteristics of the fund, the investor's portfolio and the reserve asset.
This means that, although not explicitly designed to do so, the evaluations provide a wealth of information on the distributional properties of fund of funds returns. Table 5 summarizes how often (out of a total of 875 funds) a given marginal or copula was used in the evaluations for modelling the fund return marginal and the joint distribution of the fund and the investor's portfolio return.
<< Insert Table 5 Here >> Table 5 confirms that, despite an often substantial degree of diversification in larger funds, the majority of fund of funds returns are far from normally distributed. Out of 875 funds, 519 (59.3%) funds' marginal return is better modelled by a Student-t or
Johnson distribution than a normal distribution. In addition, for only 257 (29.3%) of the 875 funds is the relationship with the investor's portfolio (consisting of 50% S&P 500 and 50% T-bonds) best modelled by the normal copula. This emphasizes how important it is to evaluate fund of funds performance using a method, which does not rely on the assumption of normally distributed returns.
Replication and Evaluation Results
As in the example in section 3, in the evaluations we assume that the representative investor's portfolio consists of 50% S&P 500 and 50% long-dated US Treasury bonds, with all exposure management done through collateralised nearby futures contracts. The reserve asset is taken to consist of a basket of nearby Eurodollar (CME), 5-year note (CBOT), 10-year note (CBOT), S&P 500 (CME), Russell 2000
(CME) and GSCI (CME) futures. We chose this particular basket for no other reason than that is well-diversified over three asset classes and therefore contains relatively little uncompensated risk. To compensate for their low volatility, the Eurodollar and 5-year note futures are leveraged by a factor 5 and the 10-year note futures by a factor 4.
Transaction costs on all futures contracts are assumed to be 1bp one-way.
Commission costs in futures tend to be extremely low, while quoted bid ask spreads in the most liquid contracts are typically not much higher than a few basis points. The plots of the fund standard deviation (Fig. 3) , standard skewness (Fig. 4) and correlation with the investor's portfolio (Fig. 5) versus the replicated values for all 875 funds. As is clear from these graphs, on average the replication of these parameters is unbiased and quite accurate. Not surprisingly, the replication of skewness can be difficult at times as fund returns may contain one or more outliers, which will have a major impact on the standard skewness statistic, but which cannot be replicated. We encountered this problem before in the example in section 3. • The confidence interval is entirely lower than 100 -531 funds (60.7%).
• The confidence interval contains 100 -181 funds (20.7%).
• The confidence interval is entirely higher than 100 -163 funds (18.6%).
This confirms that the majority of funds of hedge funds have not provided their investors with returns, which they could not have generated themselves in the futures market.
<< Insert Figure 7 Here >> Since lack of performance is one of the main reasons for funds to close down, Figure   7 shows the percentage of funds that stopped reporting to the database as a function of their KP measure. From the graph we see that there is a strong relationship. Out of the 48 funds with a KP measure below 99, no less than 24 (50%) stopped reporting. Out 6 In this context it is important to note that at least for some of the more complex distributions encountered (see Table 5 ), the correlation coefficient will not be a particularly good measure of dependence and may underestimate the true level of dependence.
of the 273 funds with a KP measure higher than 100, only 27 (9.9%) did so. A similar relationship is observed in the average KP measures of live and dead funds. The average KP measure over the 218 dead funds is 99.64, while over the 657 funds still alive the average is 99.86. Figure 8 Here >> Another question concerns the performance of funds of funds through time.
<< Insert
Especially after two years of somewhat disappointing results, it is often claimed that overall hedge fund performance is deteriorating, with the massive inflow of capital over recent years being the most obvious cause. We therefore split the track record of all funds of funds with 8 or more years of history in two equal parts and calculated the KP measure over each part. The result is plotted in Figure 8 .
The average KP measure over the first period is 99.91, while over the second, more recent, period the average is 99.89. This suggests that on average fund of funds performance has changed little over time. This is not entirely true though as Figure 8 reveals a clear tendency for funds with a relatively high (low) KP measure in the first period to produce a relatively low (high) KP measure in the second. As the assets under management of funds that do well can be expected to grow substantially (organically as well as through additional inflows) and vice versa, this finding supports the idea that increased fund size has a negative impact on future performance.
PART II: Individual Hedge Funds
Data Description
Our individual hedge funds sample consists of 2073 funds with a minimum of 4 years of history available. As before, all data were obtained from The Barclay Group as per November 2006 and funds denominated in another currency than USD are converted to USD. We study all funds together, as well as the various strategy groups (following the Barclay Group classification) separately, so we can detect possible differences between them. The strategy classification and the number of funds within each strategy group can be found in Table 6 . Table 7 and 8 provide some information on the start and end dates of the track records of the funds in our sample.
<< Insert Table 6 -8 Here >> << Insert Table 9 Here >> Table 9 provides details on the length of the available hedge fund track records. Out of the 2073 funds in the sample, only 492 have more than 10 years of history. This again reflects the fact that most funds are still relatively young and attrition levels can be very significant.
Distributional Analysis
As with funds of funds, the evaluations provide a wealth of information on the distributional properties of hedge fund returns. Table 10 summarizes how often a given marginal distribution or copula was used in the evaluations for modelling the fund marginal and the joint distribution of the fund and the investor's portfolio return. Table 10 Here >> Not all funds that stop reporting into a database do so because they close down. The majority does so, however. For more details on hedge fund and fund of funds attrition see Kat and Amin (2003a) .
<< Insert
modelled by a Student-t or Johnson distribution than a normal distribution. In addition, for only 813 (39.2%) of the 2073 funds is the relationship with the investor's portfolio of 50% S&P 500 and 50% T-bonds best modelled by the normal copula.
This emphasizes once more how important it is to evaluate hedge fund performance using a methodology, which does not rely on normally distributed returns.
Replication and Evaluation Results
For the evaluation we make the same assumptions as before. The representative investor's portfolio consists of 50% S&P 500 and 50% long-dated US Treasury bonds and the reserve asset of nearby Eurodollar, 5-year note, 10-year note, S&P 500, Russell 2000 and GSCI futures. Transaction costs on all futures contracts are assumed to be 1bp one-way. The percentage of efficient funds varies considerably between the different strategy groups, with equity short bias producing the least (0%) and the category 'other' the most (51.2%) efficient funds. Distressed securities (49.1% efficient) and multistrategy arbitrage (44.2% efficient) stand out as well. When interpreting these results, one has to keep in mind that the available dataset on hedge funds is limited and that most funds have relatively short track records. The idea behind the KP measure is that in the longer run investors receive a return that is fair compensation for the bottomline risk that they have taken, irrespective of how that risk profile is obtained. For many hedge funds, however, we may not have enough data to be able to properly observe 'the longer run'. The shorter the track record, the more the efficiency measure may be influenced by sampling error 8 , in both the fund and the assets traded in the replication strategy. The relatively high proportion of efficient funds in distressed securities and multi-strategy arbitrage for example may have been partly due to the combination of falling interest rates and shrinking credit spreads observed over recent years.
The last three columns of Table 11 show the mean, standard deviation and skewness of the frequency distribution of the efficiency measure values observed within each strategy group. For most strategies the distribution is negatively skewed, implying that within each group some funds have shown extremely bad performance relative to what could have been achieved trading a basket of liquid futures contracts. From the table we also see that especially the efficiency measures of strategies whose returns 8 Note that this applies to all performance evaluation procedures, not just the KP measure.
are known to be relatively volatile exhibit a relatively high standard deviation. Global macro and emerging markets for example exhibit relatively high standard deviations, while the opposite is true for convertible arbitrage, equity market neutral and merger arbitrage. Likewise, highly negative skewness is observed in exactly those strategies that are known to be most susceptible to shocks, such as distressed securities, convertible arbitrage, and emerging markets.
<< Insert Figure 12 Here >> Table 12 Here >> To investigate whether there is any indication of older funds doing better than younger funds or vice versa, we sorted the funds in our sample on the length of their track record. Table 12 shows the statistics of the resulting frequency distributions of the KP measure. From the means we see that, on average, age has little or no impact on performance. The standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis measures all drop when we move to funds with a longer track record, suggesting significant differences.
On the other hand, with more data available, sampling error is less of an issue, which could well explain (at least part of) the declining dispersion of observed KP measure values.
<< Insert Figure 14 Here >> Finally, we split the track record of all funds with 8 or more years of history in two equal parts and calculated the KP measure over each part. The result is shown in Figure 14 . Over all funds, the average over the first period was 100.18 while over the second, more recent, period the average was only 99.67. This indicates a very substantial deterioration in average hedge fund performance over time. As for funds of funds, Figure 14 reveals a tendency for hedge funds with a relatively high (low) KP measure in the first period to produce a relatively low (high) KP measure in the second. This again supports the hypothesis that increased fund size tends to have a negative impact on future performance.
Conclusion
In this paper we have used the hedge fund return replication technique recently introduced in Kat and Palaro (2005) to evaluate the net-of-fee performance of 875 funds of hedge funds and 2073 individual hedge funds. The results indicate that the majority of hedge funds and funds of hedge funds have not provided their investors with returns, which they could not have generated themselves by mechanically trading a basket of liquid futures contracts. Over time, we observe a substantial deterioration in overall hedge fund performance. In addition, we find a tendency for the performance of successful funds to deteriorate over time, which supports the hypothesis that increased fund size tends to hurt future performance.
Overall, only 22.5% of the 2073 individual funds and 18.6% of the funds of funds in our sample were able to beat the benchmark. This means that in terms of the KP measure individual hedge funds and funds of hedge funds are not too different. At first sight this may seem odd. With funds of funds putting on an additional layer of fees, one would expect the results for funds of funds to be substantially worse than for individual hedge funds. However, funds of funds diversify and given the low correlation between individual hedge funds, this means that the risk characteristics of fund of funds returns are typically a lot more conservative than those of individual hedge funds, which is reflected in the efficiency measure outcomes.
Compared with the various hedge fund performance evaluation studies that have been carried out over the last couple of years, our results are quite unusual. Often, the conclusion from hedge fund performance studies is that hedge funds generate superior returns, not inferior. This once again indicates how tricky factor model based performance evaluation can be. As long as one can't be sure that all relevant risk factors are fully and correctly accounted for, it is impossible to know whether unexplained returns are indeed true alpha or just unexplained because one or more risk factors were left out or specified incorrectly. Our methodology is more robust, as it relies on a simple principle: "if it can be replicated, it can't be superior". Of course, we need to make assumptions as well, but these are less crucial for the final outcome of the evaluation than the kind of assumptions required to make factor model based alphas work.
Should investors rush out to buy into those funds with the highest KP measures?
Although tempting, the answer is no. The core problem of performance evaluation is separating luck and skill. With a limited set of data, however, it is impossible to make a clean cut, whatever the method used. The KP measure is founded on the idea that in the longer run, risk and return are related, irrespective of how a given risk profile is obtained. When there are not enough data available to properly observe 'the longer run', however, the efficiency measure becomes prone to sampling error. If the available dataset is limited, it is very hard to identify the presence of any extreme (but compensated) risks for example, since by definition extreme events only occur infrequently. A fund manager may have been taking the most horrific risks, but if so far he has been lucky, the premium collected for taking on those risks will show from his track record, but the risk won't. Likewise, one or more risk factors may have done extremely well over a prolonged period of time. This will bias the available sample, which in turn may have a significant impact on the outcome of the evaluation.
Since performance evaluations over relatively short time periods will always leave us with a considerable degree of uncertainty, a high KP measure should first and foremost be interpreted as a signal that further due diligence is justified. One can only speak of truly superior performance if such follow-up research shows that the good evaluation outcome was not simply due to luck. In other words, that the manager in question has generated the observed excess return without taking any extreme risks and that all the relevant risk factors behaved in a more or less representative manner during the period under consideration. Questions like these can typically not be answered satisfactorily within a purely quantitative framework and require a thorough understanding of hedge fund strategies. No matter how sophisticated the econometrics, proper performance evaluation will therefore always remain a combination of science and art.
Finally, it has to be noted that although in terms of the returns delivered to investors, most funds of funds do not seem to add value, this does not mean there is no economic reason for funds of funds to exist. Most private and smaller institutional investors do not have the skills and/or resources required to perform the necessary due diligence that comes with hedge fund investment. In addition, given typical minimum investment requirements, small private investors will often lack sufficient funds to build up a well-diversified hedge fund portfolio. They therefore have no choice. If they want hedge funds, they will have to go through a fund of funds. 
